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ABSTRACT: The article examines the so-called slippery slope argument (SSA) against 
the legalization of active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). According to the SSA, by legal-
izing AVE, the least morally controversial type of euthanasia, we will take the first 
step onto a slippery slope and inevitably end up in the moral abyss of widespread 
abuse and violations of the rights of the weakest and most vulnerable patients. In the 
first part of the paper, empirical evidence to the contrary is presented and analyzed: 
None of the forecasted regrettable trends can be elicited from the body of existing 
statistical data. Accordingly, we have no good reason to believe either that we already 
are, or are sooner or later going to be, sliding into a moral abyss. A related question 
is then considered: Would it not be wiser and safer to stick to the status quo and 
preserve the existing legal ban on AVE even if the risk of its abuse is uncertain and 
may well turn out to be relatively low? It is argued that such an appeal to precaution-
ary reasoning fails to justify an outright legal ban on AVE for at least two reasons: 
(i) it grossly underestimates the hidden moral costs of current legal arrangements 
(competent terminal patients suffer both disrespect for their autonomous will and 
deprivation of the good of a timely death) and (ii) the ban is both too inefficient and 
disproportionate to qualify as a reasonable measure of precaution.
KEY WORDS: Euthanasia laws, moral calculus, precautionary principle, slippery slope 
arguments, timely death.
1. Introduction
Almost two decades after the well-publicized and vigorously contested le-
galization of active voluntary euthanasia (AVE) and physician-assisted suicide 
(PAS) in the Netherlands, Oregon and Belgium, and with more recent enact-
ments of such laws in a number of other countries (Luxembourg and Canada) 
and federal states (Washington, Vermont, Montana, California and, since last 
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June, the Australian state of Victoria), legalization of euthanasia has found its 
way back onto the front covers of popular magazines and into professional 
journals. Emotions are still running as high on both sides of the dispute as 
ever, with one considerable difference – there is now a wealth of empirical 
evidence against which charges of damaging and irreversible changes in our 
attitudes to, and practice of, death that legalization is supposed to initiate can 
be tested. In the first section of the paper, I aim to do just that – see which, 
if any, of the cataclysmic predictions made at the turn of the century have 
come true. My tentative and cautious answer, based on available empirical 
data, is: “Very few, if any at all.” But I also acknowledge the fact that the 
data are assembled by means of very different methods and, as a result, are 
of unequal quality and difficult to compare and generalize, let alone project 
into the future. Hence, the short- and long-term effects of legalization on 
the practice of euthanasia may still be, for all we know, unknowable at this 
moment. In the second part of the paper, I therefore consider the possibil-
ity that the existing overall ban on euthanasia may be morally called for by 
precautionary reasoning or the ethics of risk management. If the long-term 
risks and benefits and losses and gains to various groups of patients, as well as 
to society at large, of lifting the existing ban are very much uncertain, would 
it not be wiser to maintain the legal status quo and thereby avoid a potential 
moral catastrophe at the (acceptable) cost of forsaking small benefits to what 
is a tiny minority of terminal patients anyway? As tempting as this reply may 
be, it is nevertheless wrong. Neither is the threat of large-scale moral abuse 
and rights-violations of vulnerable patients realistic enough, nor can the cur-
rent outright ban on all forms of euthanasia be considered a proportionate 
and hence reasonable response to this threat. Or so I will argue.
Here, then, is the plan of the paper. I first present and briefly discuss the 
structure of slippery slope arguments (SSAs) in general and in the context of the 
debate on the legalization of euthanasia in particular. Next, I identify the warn-
ing signs of sliding down the slope and provide a check-up list of problematic 
trends. I then go on to register and assess some methodological concerns about 
how representative and reliable the collected evidence really is. If our situation 
is one of profound uncertainty, at least when it comes to the long-term effects 
of legalization, what would be the most reasonable thing to do: Maintain the 
legal status quo or remove the ban? In section 3 I provide a set of criteria for a 
reasonable use of precautionary reasoning and adopt what I believe to be the 
most plausible version of the precautionary principle for the purpose of this 
inquiry. In section 4, I apply the principle to euthanasia and conclude that 
the moral risks of legalization are typically exaggerated, while at the same time 
the moral costs of current legal and social arrangements are seriously under-
estimated. Once the moral record is set straight, the case for maintaining the 
legal status quo begins to fall apart. In the concluding section, I briefly consider 
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and reject two objections against the thesis of the moral equivalence between 
forceful termination and forceful prolongation of life – (i) that the harm of 
being forced to die is incomparably bigger than the harm of being forced to 
go on living, and so the former is justifiably of paramount concern to the 
state; and (ii) that being forced to die, unlike being forced to go on living, 
is not simply harmful but also wrong and unjust and hence the only proper 
object of legal regulation. I conclude with a plea for a change to the law.
2. Slippery slope arguments (SSAs)
Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) belong to a group of arguments from con-
sequences. We deride a certain action or measure by pointing to short- or 
long-term consequences which both its proponents and its opponents find 
equally unacceptable. More precisely, the basic idea behind an SSA is that a 
particular action, despite appearing unobjectionable in and of itself, ought 
to be resisted, because by performing this action we will have stepped onto a 
slippery slope and eventually end up, after a series of small slides, in a mor-
ally dreadful place. The strength of any particular SSA thus crucially depends 
on the plausibility of corresponding causal claims – are the small, gradual, 
almost imperceptible changes which connect the initial, morally unproblem-
atic action with the resultant, morally disastrous outcome somehow inevita-
ble, impossible to stop once set in motion, or can we stop the train of events 
at any point if we only choose to do so?
2.1. Basic types of slippery slope arguments
In the philosophical literature (van der Burg 1991; LaFollette 2005; War-
nock and Macdonald 2008; Hartogh 2009; Šuster 2015; Keown 2018), it is 
customary to distinguish between two basic types of SSAs: (a) the logical (or 
conceptual), and (b) the empirical. In the logical/conceptual version of the 
SSA, one typically argues that if we did A for reason R (or in accordance with 
principle P), then we should, on the pain of inconsistency, also do B (and C, 
and D, and…), since the very same reason, R (or the very same principle, P), 
which supports doing A also speaks in favor of performing B (and C, and D, 
and…); however, doing B (or at least doing C, or doing D, or…) would be 
clearly immoral, hence we ought to refrain from A as well. In the empirical 
version of the SSA, on the other hand, it is typically argued that if we were to 
do A, then sooner or later, given certain unalterable characteristics of human 
psychology, social and cultural norms, economic incentives and pressures, 
and so on, either we or other people would inevitably start doing B (and C, 
and D, and…) as well; doing B (or at least doing C, or doing D, or…) is 
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morally forbidden, however, hence the need to resist the initial temptation 
to do A.
In the context of legalizing euthanasia, as in many others, the strongest 
versions of SSAs are the hybrid ones, those combining the two aforemen-
tioned insights: Since there is no principled difference between (reasons that 
justify) doing A and (reasons that justify) doing B (as well as between doing B 
and doing C, and between doing C and doing D), logic, in combination with 
certain powerful internal and external factors (temptation, routine, financial 
incentives, social norms and expectations, and the like) will sooner or later, 
and inevitably, lure us (and enough others) into doing B (and C, and D) once 
we have started (considering) doing A (permissible); but B (or at least C or 
D) is clearly impermissible, hence we shouldn’t do A either. In other words, 
one can argue either (i) that once we accept, say, benevolence as the trump-
ing consideration in favor of the merciful killing of those among terminal 
patients who clearly want to die, there is, from a purely logical or rational 
point of view, only a small step from granting a patient’s request for merciful 
death (the ‘A’) to not bothering to investigate whether this is what they really 
want for themselves (the ‘B’) and from this to disregarding their express wish 
to continue living (the ‘C’). Or, alternatively, one could argue (ii) that it is 
relatively easy, psychologically speaking, to make the transition from merci-
ful killing on the explicit request of the patient (the ‘A’) to merciful killing 
regardless of her will (the ‘B’) and eventually against it (the ‘C’).
I will simply assume, as uncontroversial, that hybrid, logico-empirical 
forms of SSAs are the strongest, most convincing of all, both in the context of 
the euthanasia debate and elsewhere. Also, for the purpose of this article, I’m 
going to ignore a significant body of philosophical literature (Govier 1982; 
Enoch 2001; LaFollette 2005) highly critical of what its authors consider 
either the sloppy use or outright abuse of slippery slope arguments in debates 
on public policy. I do agree that this type of argument is often misused and 
will eventually argue that it is also mistakenly invoked in the ongoing debate 
on euthanasia, but as I’d like to preserve as much common ground with my 
opponents as possible, I won’t dwell on this.
2.2. SSAs in the debate on euthanasia
Here is the most common form of SSAs that one can find in the debates on 
the legalization of euthanasia:
(1) If, for the sake of respecting patients’ autonomous will and/or pre-
venting their suffering, active euthanasia is legalized for those ter-
minal patients who want to die, then human life is going to lose its 
unconditional value which, in turn, will create similar social expec-
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tations and pressures towards other terminally ill patients (and their 
doctors and relatives) as well. (The ‘first step’.)
(2) If human life is rendered conditionally valuable and as a result the 
pressure to terminate their lives is increased on those terminally ill 
patients who don’t want to die yet, then many of them will ask their 
doctor to euthanize them despite their preference for continued liv-
ing, and eventually doctors are going to start euthanizing those pa-
tients who are either unable to rationally and autonomously form or 
clearly express their will, or are not terminally ill at all.
(3) But killing terminally ill patients against their will or without their 
valid consent, not to mention killing people who are not even ter-
minally ill, is morally abhorrent and ought to be prevented at any 
cost. (The ‘moral abyss’.)
Hence:
(4) We ought to see that active euthanasia remains inaccessible to all 
terminally ill patients, including those among them who not only 
prefer immediate death to continued living but would also benefit 
from it.
Here, then, is the slippery slope objection against legalizing euthanasia 
in a nutshell. Legalization of active voluntary euthanasia, admittedly the least 
problematic form of euthanasia, will eventually, after a series of small but 
inevitable changes in our attitudes to, as well as law and practice of, hastening 
the death of terminally ill patients, push us (in)to a moral abyss of unsuper-
vised and unsanctioned mass euthanasia of each and every patient – from the 
comatose, demented and minors to chronically ill, depressed and those who 
prefer death over life because they are simply tired of living – and for all sorts 
of reasons and excuses – including relief of simple discomfort, concern for, or 
the loss of, dignity, existential anxiety and despair.
Now even though sliding down the slope is supposed to be slow and 
gradual and as such often difficult to notice, some phenomena are said to be 
characteristic for, or indicative of, it. Legalization of voluntary active euthana-
sia will, its opponents typically assert, gradually but predictably, bring about:
(i)  an increase in the number of requests for active voluntary euthanasia
(ii)   an increase in the proportion of granted requests for euthanasia
(iii) an increase in the number and/or proportion of cases of non-vol-
untary and involuntary euthanasia (euthanasia without request or 
EWRs)
(iv) an increase in the number of euthanasia cases among members of 
vulnerable groups (women, elderly, children, people with no health 
insurance – where applicable, poor and disabled people, and so on)
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(v)    an expansion of the range of those eligible for euthanasia from 
competent to incompetent patients (minors, elderly, demented, or 
chronically depressed)
(vi)  a relaxation of the legal safeguards against abuse and the corre-
sponding increase in the frequency and magnitude of abuse
(vii)   a growing disregard of prescribed procedures (neglect of the duty 
to discuss the issue with the patient or their family, the duty to 
consult another doctor, to document, and report about, cases, and 
the like)
(viii) a broadening of the scope of ‘legitimate’ reasons for euthanasia 
requests (from unbearable physical pain and suffering over unbear-
able psychological pain and discomfort to the lost sense of control 
and dignity and, eventually, the loss of the meaning of life and 
even existential boredom)
(ix)  a growing disrespect of the unconditional value of human life, or a 
changed, and irreversibly so, attitude towards it.
Has any of this materialized?
3. Evidence from ‘social laboratories’
In the nineties, when it all began, the heated debate on the merits and de-
merits of legalization, and the growing opposition to it, was based more on 
speculation and imagination than on facts and evidence. The little data there 
was (most critics, foremost Callahan (1992), Kumar and Bagaric (2001) and 
Keown (2004), appealed to inconclusive findings of the first and the second 
Remmelink report), was interpreted uncharitably and then extrapolated, 
with little thought given to what actually forms the appropriate comparison 
class. In the absence of prima facie compelling, let alone conclusive, empiri-
cal evidence, false analogies were drawn in support of such doomsday rea-
soning. The bitter lesson from the Nazi ‘euthanasia program’ was supposed 
to be clear enough to silence rare calls for a legal change along the Dutch 
and Belgian lines. Today, more than a decade after the passage of the first 
laws on euthanasia, however, there is no need to base our judgment and 
decision on speculation and dubious analogies. Instead, we have plenty of 
carefully assembled empirical data from large, natural-size ‘social laborato-
ries’ to rely on:
● Netherlands (AVE and PAS legalized in 2001, after being more or less 
tolerated for many years)
● Belgium (AVE and PAS decriminalized in 2002)
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● US states of Oregon (PAS decriminalized in 1998), Washington (PAS 
decriminalized in 1998) and (since very recently) Vermont, Montana 
and California
● conditionally Switzerland (where assisted suicide has been legal since 
1942)
● Luxemburg (AVE and PAS legalized in 2009)
● Canada (AVE and PAS legal since 2016)
● The Australian state of Victoria (AVE legal since June 2019).
Let me briefly summarize those empirical findings.1 Some of the trends 
forecast at the turn of the century have no doubt materialized. But they seem 
to belong to unproblematic categories. Take, for instance, the least problem-
atic of all, the number and proportion of cases of active voluntary euthanasia 
(AVE). In the Netherlands, we have witnessed a small, but steady rise in both 
figures since 2001. After a sudden and significant decline in 2005, one which 
is yet to be explained, the trend took another sharp turn upwards and reached 
its first peak in 2010, only to be superseded in every following year except 
2018. The latest number of euthanasia cases is 6585 (in 2017) for the Neth-
erlands and 2022 (in 2015) for Belgium, meaning that in less than a decade 
the number of euthanasia cases in both countries has more than doubled. It 
is important to put this significant surge into perspective, however – at 4.5 
percent the cases of AVE and PAS still make up a relatively small proportion 
of the total number of deaths. The same goes for the ratio between expressed 
and granted requests for euthanasia – approximately every second request 
that was made repeatedly over a longer period of time by a terminally ill 
patient was granted in 2010 and around seven out of ten were granted in 
2016, comparable to the period before legalization and an indication that 
euthanasia has not come to be treated as a default option by physicians sim-
ply because they no longer need to fear prosecution. The data from Oregon 
reinforce this point. The number of Death-With-Dignity-Act prescription 
recipients has risen steadily over the years and reached a new high with 249 
in 2018. This was accompanied by a similar trend in the growing number of 
physician-assisted suicides which also peaked in 2018 at 168. And yet the ra-
tio between all the prescriptions that were issued and those that were eventu-
ally used to terminate life has remained steady in the long run – around two 
1 In this section, I draw heavily on the following sources: Battin et al. 2007, Buiting 
et al. 2010a, Chambaere et al. 2010, Chambaere et al. 2015, Dierickx et al. 2016, Emanuel 
et al. 2016, Euthanasia in Belgium, Griffiths 2008, Heide 2019, Heide et al. 2017, Heide et 
al. 2007, Keown 2018, Levy 2011, Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al. 2012, Oregon’s Death With 
Dignity Act. 2018 Data Summary, Rietjens et al. 2009, Rurup et al. 2011 and Warnock and 
Macdonald 2008. 
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thirds of the patients with a prescription for a deadly drug end up obtaining 
and using it. At a total number of 1459 since the law was passed in 1997, 
DWDA-related deaths only account for a tiny fraction of all annual deaths in 
the state of Oregon. More precisely, less than half a percent (Oregon Death 
With Dignity Act. 2018 Data Summary). In Switzerland, every hundredth 
death is an instance of assisted suicide.
It is important to note, with respect to the rising numbers and shares of 
deaths by euthanasia and PAS in the Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon, that 
this was both to be expected and that, given the morally unproblematic char-
acter of both AVE and PAS, it shouldn’t really give rise to moral concerns. 
Let’s look at some other, more troublesome categories then. Has the number 
of cases of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia increased? No, both the 
total number and the proportion of cases of euthanasia without request (or 
EWRs) among all deaths has either gone down, as in the Netherlands (from 
0,8 percent in 1990 to 0,3 percent in 2015), or remained constant, as in 
Belgium. Has euthanasia perhaps become more frequent among members of 
vulnerable social groups? Not according to available empirical evidence:
We found no evidence to justify the grave and important concern often ex-
pressed about the potential for abuse – namely, the fear that legalized physi-
cian-assisted dying will target the vulnerable or pose the greatest risk to people 
in vulnerable groups. The evidence available cannot provide a conclusive proof 
about the impact on vulnerable patients […]. Nevertheless, data shows that 
people who died with a physician’s assistance were more likely to be members 
of groups enjoying comparative economic, social, educational and professional 
privileges. […] [T]here is no current factual support for the so-called slippery 
slope concerns about the risks of legalisation of assisted dying – concerns that 
death in this way would be practised more frequently on persons in vulnerable 
groups. (Battin et al. 2007: 597) 
Once again, the data from Oregon appear to corroborate this verdict. Of alto-
gether 168 registered PAS deaths in 2018, for instance, 79 percent were aged 
65 years or older. The median age of death was 74 years. As in previous years, 
descendants were commonly white (97.0 percent) and well-educated (47.3 
percent had a least a baccalaureate degree). Patients’ underlying illnesses were 
similar to those of previous years. Most patients had cancer (62.5 percent), 
followed by neurological disease (14.9 percent) and heart/circulatory disease 
(9.5 percent). Most patients (87.5 percent) died at home, and most (90.5 
percent) were enrolled in hospice care. Excluding unknown cases, most (99.3 
percent) had some form of health care insurance. As in previous years, the 
three most frequently reported end-of-life concerns were loss of autonomy 
(91.7 percent), decreasing ability to participate in activities that made life 
enjoyable (90.5 percent), and loss of dignity (66.7 percent) (Oregon Death 
With Dignity Act. 2018 Data Summary).
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Has the range of motives and reasons that are being acknowledged as le-
gitimate grounds for a euthanasia request expanded? No, apart from a couple 
of highly publicized cases in Belgium and the Netherlands, by far the most 
common grounds (covering over 90 percent of cases) both for issuing and 
granting such a request are unbearable physical and psychological pain and 
suffering due to a terminal condition, the fear of the loss of dignity and little 
or zero prospects for recovery.
3.1. A preliminary conclusion
So far, then, empirical findings appear to have failed to vindicate the 
catastrophic scenarios envisioned by opponents of legalization. The total 
number of deaths by AVE and PAS, as well as their share in all deaths, rose 
slightly in the first years after the legalization and then rather sharply in the 
last couple of years (to approximately 4.5 percent of all deaths in both the 
Netherlands and Belgium (or, more precisely, Flanders), but this was to be 
expected and is not problematic in itself, since the vast majority of them 
(around 70 percent) come from cancer patients in the last stages of the dis-
ease and are estimated to have shortened their lives by a few days to a few 
weeks. The rate of cases of euthanasia without an explicit patient request 
(EWRs), instead of exploding, is either steadily declining (as in the Neth-
erlands) or remaining stable (as in Belgium). Among the reasons given for 
granting patients’ requests for AVE and PAS, terminal patients’ wish to die 
a dignified death and the futility of treatment remain by far the most com-
mon. Despite some highly publicized cases, such as the deaf Belgian twins 
Marc and Eddy Verbessem, the Belgian transsexual Nathan Verhelst or Noa 
Pothoven, a troubled Dutch teenager victim of childhood sexual abuse, lit-
tle, if any, transition to other more problematic reasons, such as tiredness of 
life or existential fatigue, has been observed. Furthermore, physicians seem 
to keep taking their duty to comply with the law on euthanasia seriously, 
if we are to judge by the rate of reported cases of AVE and PAS and their 
observance of the standards of due care.2 And finally, the incidence of AVE, 
PAS and EWR among members of vulnerable groups (elderly, women, chil-
dren, uninsured, poor, depressed, physically disabled, people with chronic 
non-terminal conditions, uneducated, members of racial and ethnic mi-
norities,…) is no higher than in the population at large (AIDS-patients 
being the only exception).
2 The exact nature of, and the reason for, approximately 20 percent of cases of euthanasia 
that go unreported every year is disputed. The gap, however, seems better explained as a result 
of differing conceptualizations and taxonomies, rather than a deliberate attempt to cover up 
illegal killings (see Buiting 2010b).
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3.2. Some remaining concerns
This, however, is an optimistic account of what goes on in the Netherlands 
and Belgium. Many critics would no doubt dismiss such optimism as unwar-
ranted. After all, the Netherlands has seen the foundation of Levenseindek-
liniek, or End of Life Clinic, which matches doctors willing to perform 
euthanasia with those patients whose requests for aid in dying have already 
been rejected by another doctor for not meeting the legal requirements, and 
which was responsible for the euthanasia of some 750 people in 2017 (de 
Bellaigue 2019). In addition, the number of patients euthanized despite a 
psychiatric diagnosis, or with an explicit aim to end suffering caused by an 
incurable mental disease, is steadily on the rise. While in almost 90 percent 
of the total 6585 patients euthanized in the Netherlands in 2017, patients 
were suffering from cancer, heart and artery disease or diseases of the nerv-
ous system, such as Parkinson’s and multiple sclerosis, three of those patients 
were nevertheless in an advanced stage of dementia and 166 in earlier stages. 
Furthermore, whereas ending of life without an explicit patient request de-
creased, from 0.8 percent in 1990 to 0.3 percent in 2015, other forms of 
hastening patient’s death short of euthanasia have gained ground – the use of 
morphine to alleviate symptoms while taking into account possible hastening 
of death as a result increased, for instance, from 19 percent of all deaths in 
1990 to 36 percent in 2010 and 2015, and the share of terminal patients pro-
vided with continuous deep sedation has increased from 8.2 to 18.3 percent 
of all patients between 2005 and 2015 (van der Heide 2017: 492).
John Keown, the most outspoken and influential among the critics of 
Dutch and Belgian euthanasia practice, believes the existent system of moni-
toring and control is clearly flawed and that we are indeed witnessing the 
sliding down a dangerous slope. He summarizes the reasons for pessimism 
thus (Keown 2018: 180–210):
(i)  The system of control is flawed by design, since it is based on self-
reports and it is naïve to expect the doctors violating euthanasia 
regulations to report their own unlawful conduct.
(ii)  Despite the relatively stable numbers of reported cases of euthana-
sia, there is still a considerable number of those that remain unre-
ported and hence unregistered and unchecked.
(iii)   Due to a narrow legal definition of euthanasia as merciful killing on 
request, no record is kept of cases where doctors have intentionally 
shortened the life of their patient by stopping treatment.
(iv) Eligibility criteria have been gradually relaxed from ‘unbearable 
physical suffering’ over ‘unbearable psychological suffering’ to ‘exis-
tential suffering and fatigue’, ‘completed life’ and ‘dignified death’.
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(v)    Euthanasia regulations and practice have been gradually amended 
to enable access to euthanasia for minors, and the number of 
patients with psychiatric disorders with requests for euthanasia 
granted despite a well-documented history of mental health issues 
is on a steady rise.
(vi)  Incidences of non-voluntary euthanasia are not just disconcert-
ingly high, euthanasia without patient’s request has long been 
condoned by legal, medical, and political establishment in certain 
circumstances.
(vii)   Euthanasia is being normalized and increasingly used as an alterna-
tive to palliative care, rather than the last resort.3
One promising way to dismiss this and similar evidence is to argue that 
even if all this is not just indeed happening, but is indicative and predictive 
of certain future trends, we are still firmly and safely within the boundaries of 
the legal, let alone morally permissible. So why panic? This is so (according to 
an explanation I borrow from Agnes van der Heide 2019) because when par-
liaments pass euthanasia laws, they typically do this against the tide of politi-
cal, religious and cultural opposition which forces legislators to pass the most 
restrictive and conservative version of the law, one that not only restricts the 
right to euthanasia to the smallest possible subset of those patients who might 
benefit from it, but also erects a maximum number of obstacles on the path 
to exercising such a right.4 It is hardly surprising, then, or so the argument 
goes, if later on, as the practice gains ground and becomes normal(ized), 
these pragmatic but essentially irrational obstacles are gradually removed one 
by one. This, in a sense, confirms the logico-conceptual version of the SSA, 
insofar as some restrictions that were initially imposed on the practice make 
little sense from both logical and normative perspective – in other words, 
they form an incoherent and/or normatively arbitrary set of norms. Take, for 
instance, the prohibition against euthanizing minors – what alone matters, 
from a moral point of view, is not the patient’s age, but his or her decisional 
competence. And some minors do, and still others predictably will, display 
more of that quality than many adults belonging to the same group of pa-
tients. Excluding them from the group of patients eligible for euthanasia and 
PAS on the grounds of their youth hence amounts to unjust and unfair dis-
crimination. We can apply the same reasoning to other more or less common 
3 For a similarly alarmist (albeit journalistic) account of the current developments relat-
ing to euthanasia law and practice in the Netherlands and Belgium, see de Bellaigue (2019).
4 For instance, the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act passed in 2017 in the Australian state 
of Victoria includes no less than 68 safeguards against possible error and abuse (Wilmot and 
White 2019).
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criteria of eligibility. Take the distinction between terminal and (incurable) 
chronic disease, or between physical and psychological suffering. Most leg-
islators initially choose to draw a line within those two pairs of categories, 
allowing, for example, euthanasia for terminally ill patients who endure un-
bearable physical pain, but prohibiting it for patients who suffer unbearable 
pain, whether physical or psychological, due to an incurable chronic illness. 
But this kind of differential treatment is hard, if not impossible, to justify 
– after all, if suffering due to their medical condition is equally unbearable 
for the patient, and the condition causing this suffering just as incurable in 
both cases, why does it matter whether and/or how soon the disease will kill 
them, or whether the source of their unbearable suffering is physical or psy-
chological in nature?
So, where does all this leave us? For the sake of the argument, I’ll assume 
that it leaves us in a sort of epistemic limbo and corresponding agential pa-
ralysis. We cannot tell yet, at this moment in time and on the basis of avail-
able evidence, whether the fears and worries over the potential adversarial 
long-term effects of euthanasia legislation are justified or not, or determine 
their risk and/or magnitude with sufficient certainty and precision.
4. A reasonable measure of precaution?
A simple cost-benefit analysis – the most popular method for evaluating al-
ternative social policies – would have us weigh the putative benefits of le-
galization for the first group, the competent and autonomous terminally ill 
patients, against the harms that it is likely to impose on the second, the in-
competent and/or non-autonomous dying patients. This, in turn, requires 
answering the following two questions: (a) how big a risk is it that some peo-
ple are going to suffer the harm and/or the wrong of forced, untimely death 
as a result of the legalization of AVE, and (b) how big a harm, or wrong, is 
it?5 But what if neither the risk nor the size of such harm can be determined 
with sufficient precision to do the necessary calculation? Is it not the case 
5 Elizabeth Anderson (1993, especially pp. 190–216) presents a strong case against using 
cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) in evaluating and justifying social policies. Her argument is that 
cost-benefit analyses are tailored to simulate efficiency characteristic of market allocations and 
so presuppose commodification of public goods, such as public health and safety as well as 
clean air and water (or environment). Even though CBAs are hailed as a device for rendering 
political/public institutions more responsive to people’s values (as revealed in their hypotheti-
cal choices), they fail to serve this function with respect to non-commodity values.  But isn’t 
then a cost-benefit analysis badly misplaced in the present context, given that life is one of, 
if not the, most prominent non-commodity value(s)? Not really. For we are here considering 
moral costs and benefits, such as harms, wrongdoings and injustices, alone. And comparing 
those need not presuppose ascribing monetary value to them, and so objectifying and com-
modifying them in ways which threaten to compromise, or subvert, their true moral value.
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then that we better err on the side of caution and avoid such a risk of harm 
altogether?
Precautionary reasoning is typically employed in situations with the fol-
lowing three features: there is (a) a threat of significant and/or irreversible 
harm; (b) scientific uncertainty about impact and causality; and (c) precau-
tionary response on offer. It’s played a prominent role in the debates over 
genetically modified food (Myhr 2010), global warming and climate change 
(Gardiner 2006), and genetically engineered human enhancement (Glan-
non 2008). The precautionary principle (PP) has also been invoked in medi-
cal ethics before, in the context of evaluating research into the expansion of 
human lifespan and the heated debate on human cloning, but with mixed 
results – while some welcomed this novel and expanded approach (see Glan-
non 2002), others criticized it as irrational and stifling scientific discoveries 
(Harris and Holm 1999). The precautionary principle is often criticized for 
being overly cautious and insofar irrational – for more precisely, precluding 
sure benefits for the sake of preventing merely potential, or even imaginary, 
harms.6 Appeals to worst-case scenarios, with little or no regard for how im-
probable these are, may enjoy considerable popularity but fairly little cred-
ibility. As long as the magnitude of potential harm is not properly balanced 
against its probability, such appeals ponder to irrational fear.
To block this sort of criticism, and save the principle, David Resnik 
(2003) came up with the criteria for a legitimate appeal to, or the ‘scientific 
use’ of, the precautionary principle which I’ll simply adopt for the purpose 
of assessing the merits of the existing ban on euthanasia as a precautionary 
measure. According to Resnik, the principle can be used scientifically, i.e., as 
a plausible principle of practical rationality (a principle that helps to guide 
our choices and actions in circumstances of uncertainty or even ignorance), 
provided that:
(1) potential threats addressed by the principle are not only enormous 
in magnitude but also plausible, and
(2) adopted measures of precaution are reasonable.7
We may then use epistemic criteria, such as consistency, coherence and 
explanatory power, to assess whether the threat is plausible, as well as practi-
6 For a particularly harsh critique, see Sunstein (2005, 2007).
7 However, one feature of precautionary reasoning is ominously missing from the above 
formulation, namely that the threat of harm be serious and/or irreversible: “When an activity 
raises threats of serious or irreversible harm to human health or the environment, precautionary 
measures which effectively prevent the possibility of harm (e.g., moratorium, prohibition, etc.) 
shall be taken even if the causal link between the activity and the possible harm has not been 
proven or the causal link is weak and the harm is unlikely to occur” (Harris and Holm 1999: 
358). I am grateful to Kian Mintz-Woo for alerting me to this point.
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cal considerations, like effectiveness, proportionality, cost-effectiveness, re-
alism and consistency, to determine whether the response to the threat is 
reasonable.
In the remainder of the paper I’ll briefly address two of the abovemen-
tioned issues: a) is the threat that we are trying to deflect by an outright ban 
on euthanasia a plausible one? and b) is our response to that threat reasonable 
or, more precisely, efficient and proportionate?
4.1. Is the threat of harm plausible?
At least three types of potential threats could be said to be averted by the 
existing legal prohibition on euthanasia: (a) risk of harms (of forced and/or 
untimely deaths); (b) risk of wrongdoings (wronging people by depriving 
them of something that is either valuable to them or that they are entitled to 
do or to have, without compensating them for the said loss); and/or (c) risk 
of rights-violations/injustices (violating people’s right to life/not-to-be-killed, 
right to autonomy or some similar right).
But how plausible are these threats? The empirical data collected, as we 
have seen, don’t give an equivocal answer to this question. Not only do em-
pirical data fail to substantiate slippery slope concerns, little so far suggests 
that even the very few and relatively insignificant changes in attitudes to, 
and practices of, assisted dying in the Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon, are 
the effect of the legalization of AVE and PAS rather than, say, something that 
preceded it and only surfaced thanks to a closer monitoring upon legalization, or 
something caused by changes in other social, economic, cultural, and so on factors 
which accompanied, but were not the result of, the legal change. Countries where 
euthanasia is still outlawed are simply the wrong comparison class for that 
purpose, even if their figures were to suggest (which they unequivocally do 
not) that euthanasia is neither as widely endorsed nor as commonly practiced 
as elsewhere. In order to prove the causality claim, we would need to compare 
not only the figures in those countries that have lifted the ban on euthanasia 
prior to legalization and afterwards, but also discount the influence of other 
variables, a task that requires assessing the truth value or, alternatively, the 
plausibility of difficult counterfactual claims.
Besides, at least on the face of it, the causality claim is counterintuitive. 
Why should the legalization of a less controversial type of euthanasia increase 
the incidence of more controversial types of euthanasia? There is nothing 
odd or surprising about the prediction that as soon as you legalize active vol-
untary euthanasia, the number of both requests issued by terminal patients 
and those granted by physicians is going to soar. For if there is considerable 
demand for some service, the provision of which comes at a high social and 
135F. KLAMPFER:  Euthanasia Laws, Slippery Slopes, and (Un)Reasonable Precaution
legal cost, then a significant reduction in the costs attached to it will pre-
dictably boost both demand for, and supply of, it. But there is no similarly 
obvious, social-psychological explanation for why legalization of voluntary 
euthanasia would cause an increase in the numbers of non-voluntary or even 
involuntary euthanasia.8
4.2. Is potential harm serious and irremediable?
Whatever the exact nature of catastrophic predictions, and we’ve seen them 
range from merely debating the relaxation of certain restrictions to tolerating 
or even encouraging mass executions of those deemed socially useless and/or 
burdensome, the most serious challenge the opponents of legalized euthana-
sia need to meet is to show that once the chain of events gradually leading to 
this dreaded outcome is set in motion, it can no longer be stopped . We may 
have set it in motion by first passing laws and then installing and regulating 
practices in a certain way, i.e., by our collective will and/or agency, but once 
we’ve done that there is no return, through deployment of the very same legal 
or political means, to a previous stage that we then realize was still morally 
acceptable or far superior. In other words, while it may have been in our col-
lective power to set the said process in motion, it is no longer in our collective 
power to reverse or even just stop it. Not even, we are expected to believe, 
with the current foresight over, and acute warnings against, potential risks.
Now I’m quite happy to concede that if the worst, most catastrophic 
scenario or anything like it eventually comes true, the resultant harm will be 
very serious and irremediable – worldwide, tens of thousands of people are 
going to be killed either without their consent (more likely) or against their 
explicit will (less likely), and the harm of violent, non-consensual death is not 
something that any victim can be compensated for. That said, however, what 
reasons do we have for thinking the legalization of euthanasia is a one-way 
road to hell with no stops, sort of a journey on a runaway train? The unsub-
stantiated assumption of collective powerlessness in the face of an oncoming 
moral catastrophe strikes me as the weakest premise in the case against legal-
ized euthanasia. The opponents’ case rests on a specific interpretation and 
extrapolation of available empirical data from the Netherlands and Belgium. 
But even granting that these data indicate problematic trends in the practice 
of euthanasia in the aforementioned countries, there is still a long way to the 
conclusion that the Dutch and Belgian failure to block these developments is 
necessary rather than accidental, a flaw in the very idea of a merciful death, 
8 Two kinds of arguments are usually adduced in support of the causality claim: historical 
analogies or precedents (foremost the legalization of abortion in the sixties and the legalization 
of same-sex marriages at the turn of millennium) and a priori reasoning. 
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not in its clumsy implementation. It is one thing to assert, on the basis of an 
allegedly poor Dutch and Belgian record, that their practice of euthanasia 
leaves a lot to be desired, and something completely different to convincingly 
show that not only can the Dutch and the Belgians not improve it, no one 
can – no matter what.
4.3. Is our response to the risk of harm 
(and rights-violations) reasonable?
The answer to the above question will depend both on the magnitude and 
the probability of expected harm (and rights-violations) due to legalization. 
Peoples’ intuitions about the worst-case scenarios are too often shaped by the 
magnitude of harm alone. This is even more common when such scenarios 
are cognitively available to them and hence spring to mind more easily, as is 
the case with euthanasia, where opponents have managed to infect people’s 
perception and grip people’s imagination with the graphic tales of Nazi abuse. 
What is often overlooked as well in discussions on euthanasia is that for a fair 
assessment of different options (outright ban, de facto and de jure decrimi-
nalization, proper legalization, and so on) we need to take into account the 
benefits as well as the costs thereof and that with the alleged benefits in focus, 
the latter are too often overlooked. Cass Sunstein makes a valid point in this 
respect:
In some contexts, people are acutely aware of the burdens imposed by attempt-
ing to eliminate worst-case scenarios; but in other contexts, they are not attuned 
to those burdens at all. In regulatory policy, for example, those who urge exten-
sive precautions against the worst cases often disregard the possibility that those 
very precautions can inflict losses and even create risks of their own. Risks, and 
bad worst cases, may be on all sides. (Sunstein 2007: 7)
Hence, we should start paying more attention to the hidden social and moral 
costs of current legal arrangements (disrespect of autonomous will, depri-
vation of the good of timely death, the fear of the loss of dignity, lack of 
assurance, and so on) if we are to hope for a fair assessment of comparative 
(dis)advantages.
4.3.1. Hidden moral costs of a current legal ban
By focusing on what Cass Sunstein calls ‘worst-case scenarios’, we tend to 
ignore, or underestimate, the more or less hidden moral costs of current legal 
arrangements. The preference for the status quo would be rational, if its ben-
efits clearly outweighed its costs, moral ones included. But is the outcome of 
such a cost-benefit analysis really so evidently in its favor? Such a conclusion 
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is more often based on wild guesses and questionable assumptions than on 
statistical facts.9
Going back to our initial question, we first need to divide it in two: i) is 
the outright ban on euthanasia efficient? and ii) is the outright ban on eutha-
nasia proportionate? The answer to both questions, I submit, is negative: The 
outright legal ban on (all forms of ) euthanasia is inefficient, for euthanasia 
appears to be widely practiced, albeit covertly, despite the official ban. This 
suspicion is hard to prove, as due to the lack of research into daily end-of-life 
decisions, evidence is scarce. Not quite non-existent, however. According to 
a survey conducted in 1995 and 1996 in Australia (see Kuhse et al. 1997), 
for instance, AVE and PAS accounted for 1.8 percent of all deaths, doctors 
actively and intentionally ended patients’ lives without explicit request in 3.5 
percent of all deaths and 24.7 percent of all deaths were preceded by a deci-
sion not to treat with the intention to explicitly end life, figures not that dif-
ferent from those in countries with legalized euthanasia. These findings have 
been disputed and the numbers, even if correct, may not be representative 
of other countries. And yet, the sad truth is that we simply don’t know the 
size of the phenomenon because of the lack of interest in researching the un-
dercover practice. Too often, an outright legal ban on euthanasia is coupled 
with a total lack of control over who makes and carries out the bulk of the 
unavoidable end-of-life decisions,10 as well as a much more lenient attitude 
to medical decisions which also either intentionally or predictably hasten the 
death of a terminally ill patient, such as withholding or withdrawing life-
prolonging treatment and terminal sedation, for a simple reason that they are 
classified as either passive, i.e., permissible euthanasia, or not euthanasia at 
all. On the other hand, the outright ban is disproportionate, because current 
legal arrangements protect (the rights and interests of ) one group of people, 
the incompetent terminal patients, at the expense of (the rights and interests 
 9 As well as opportunity costs, i.e., the benefits that we forgo when we postpone, or give 
up on, a disputed legal or political measure. For an elaboration of this point, see Harris and 
Holm (1999) and Hughes (2006).
10 Empirical disputes are so intractable for a number of reasons (Smith 2007). Take, for 
instance, a seemingly simple issue, that of efficiency – which is more efficient in protecting 
the rights and interests of terminally ill patients, legal ban on euthanasia or its legalization and 
regulation? Since there is little, if any, evidence of the incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia 
prior to the legalization of voluntary euthanasia and PAS, and the corresponding evidence 
from countries with a legal ban is even scanter, we seem to lack any epistemic grounds for ad-
judicating between the two legal regimes even along this simple measure. We could, of course, 
try to compare the numbers in countries with restrictive legislation and those in countries that 
have relaxed their legislation. Opponents of legalization protest such comparisons, however, 
and insist that due to the uniqueness of each country’s situation and its specific interplay of 
social, cultural, political, economic, and legal factors, other countries provide a wrong com-
parison class (Keown 2018: 81–82). While I don’t find this objection convincing at all, I can-
not pursue the issue any further here. 
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of ) another, namely the competent terminal patients. In addition, it imposes, 
or allows, actual harm and injustice on the latter for the sake of preventing a 
merely potential, future harm and injustice to the former.
Even in the worst-case scenarios, it will obviously depend on both the 
probability and the magnitude of potential harm – how likely is it that a 
significant proportion of terminally ill patients are going to be forced to end 
their lives prematurely and how big a harm or wrong is it to be rushed into 
a premature death, compared to the harm and injustice of being denied an 
immediate exit? I can think of three possible rebuttals of the charge of dis-
proportionality:
(i)  Incompetent, vulnerable, non-autonomous terminal patients vastly 
outnumber competent, autonomous terminal patients, in fact, 
within this group of patients, the latter form a tiny and in that re-
spect a negligible minority.
(ii)   The harm of forced death is incomparably bigger than the harm of 
forced life, and so prevention of the former is justifiably paramount, 
both morally and legally. (Call this ‘the asymmetry claim’, or AC.)
(iii) Forcing a person to die, unlike forcing her to live/go on living, is 
not simply harmful, but also wrongful, and since it is the business 
of the state to only protect its citizens against wrongful harm, com-
petent terminal patients are not discriminated against or treated un-
justly when legally denied this kind of last exit.
I will leave the consideration under (i) aside. It is a common and often 
heard complaint, but one with surprisingly little evidential support adduced 
in its favor. Let me address the other two objections in turn.
4.3.2. The notion, and the harm, of untimely death
Intuitively, it is much worse if your life is shortened than if it is prolonged 
against your will. Its intuitive appeal notwithstanding, however, AC is demon-
strably false. We can see this by considering reasons for accepting the truth of 
the contrary claim, call it the equivalence thesis (ET): Morally speaking, being 
forced to live is, or can in principle be, just as bad as being forced to die.
To see this, we need another concept, that of a timely death. Let’s say 
that S’s death at t is timely iff it secures the maximum prudential value of S’s 
life to S, that is, iff no death of S at any earlier or later point of S’s life could 
secure equal or greater overall prudential value of that life to S. Correspond-
ingly, then, S’s death at t is untimely iff it fails to maximize the overall pru-
dential/personal value of S’s life for S.
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We can add the following: The more detrimental the effect that un-
timely death has on the overall prudential value of S’s life for S, the worse it 
is for S.
There are two types of untimely deaths, the premature and the delayed. 
Notice, however, that since they both deprive the subject of life of some 
amount of prudential value that her life has for her – premature death de-
stroys life at a point when its overall value is still ascending, while the delayed 
one destroys it at the point when its overall prudential value has already be-
gun to decrease – they are not just bad for her, and, insofar as they are harm-
ful, prudentially bad for one and the same reason, the latter can in principle 
be worse than the former (if we conceive of the harm of untimely death as 
the deprivation of the good of a timely death, then the bigger the deprivation, 
the bigger the harm).
4.3.3. The wrongness (and even injustice) of being forced to live
This brings us to the third objection against my charge that an outright 
legal ban on euthanasia, even as a precautionary measure against the risk of 
harm, wrongdoing, or injustice, is disproportionate and hence unreason-
able – namely that even if both premature and delayed deaths are harm-
ful, only the former are in addition also wrongful and/or unjust (i.e., in 
violation of patients’ rights) and hence a proper object of criminal law. The 
challenge for a proponent of the legal right to (be helped to) die, then, is 
to find a plausible candidate for a right (or a set of rights) that the state 
violates when it forces all terminally ill patients, irrespective of their will, to 
continue living.
Now, as already established in the previous section, an indeterminable, 
but possibly not insignificant subset of such patients is being harmed, and of-
ten harmed to the same extent, by having the option, and the good, of timely 
death precluded by an indiscriminate legal ban. But does this harm, whether 
we conceive of it as caused or merely allowed by the existing legal regime, re-
ally amount to wrongdoing or injustice? Surely there can be no such right as 
the right to a timely death, but without such a right, what other individual 
right (or valid moral principle) could possibly be violated by forced living? 
In this section, I’d like to argue, in broad brushstrokes, that this triumphant 
impression is mistaken. Foreclosing the option of a timely and/or dignified 
death doesn’t just frustrate a person’s legitimate interest, it also violates her 
right to life, or, if you wish, self-determination; as such it is the lawgiver’s 
proper concern and/or proper object of criminal law for pretty much the 
same or very similar reasons for which we have outlawed killing people. Be-
low is a sketch of an argument towards such a conclusion.
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(1) The right to life entails a (liberty-)right to shape your life according 
to your own (reasonable) conception of the good.
(2) The time and the manner of one’s death importantly determine the 
overall shape, duration and value of one’s life.
Hence:
(3) Every person has a (defeasible) prima facie right to determine, in 
ideal conditions of choice, when and how they will die.
Hence:
(4) In criminalizing euthanasia and PAS, the state violates one’s right 
to life.
The above argument is admittedly sketchy. In addition, many will find 
my broad interpretation of the right to life as a liberty-right to shape one’s 
life in the light of one’s conception of good, as stated in premise (1), over-
stretched. One way to block this objection would be to substitute a more 
controversial right, the right to (shape one’s) life, with a less controversial 
one, the right to self-determination.11 This, I submit, can, but need not, be 
done. My conjecture is that in the relevant context – and recall, the context 
is one of terminally ill patients who either due to their medical condition 
or the effects of drugs have permanently lost their capacity to form and, by 
extension, express their will – the two de facto come to the same. In other 
words, given that there is no valuable life left to protect by the right to life, 
the appeal to this right only makes sense from the point of view of due respect 
for the patient’s autonomy or self-determination – insofar as taking their life 
is morally objectionable at all, it cannot be because we will have destroyed 
something valuable, but because of the disrespect of their autonomous will. 
Notice, however, that by definition, these patients have not only not declared 
their will, they have not even (as far as we know) formed one. How, then, can 
11 Despite contrary appearance, the said substitution is not ad hoc. It is backed by what 
Dan Brock calls rights-based (as opposed to duty-based) accounts of the morality of killing. 
According to such accounts, “persons have a moral right not to be killed, but that right, like 
other rights, is theirs to use as they see fit so long as they are competent to do so; specifically, 
persons can waive their right not to be killed when they judge that their future is not on balance 
a good to them, and so its loss will not constitute a harm. In such cases, when they waive their 
right not to be killed by refusing life support, or by requesting terminal sedation, physician 
assisted suicide, or voluntary active euthanasia, these actions taken by their physicians (or oth-
ers) will not wrong them by taking from them without their consent what is rightfully theirs, 
that is will not violate their right not to be killed. Nor will these actions harm the patient who 
reasonably judges further life to be on balance a burden and unwanted. In this rights-based 
view of the morality of killing, it will be the voluntariness of the patient’s request for forgoing 
life support, terminal sedation, physician assisted suicide, or voluntary active euthanasia that is 
crucial to their moral permissibility. The rights-based account gives fundamental importance 
to individual self-determination or autonomy” (Brock 2004: 74).
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doctors be guilty of disregarding it when they shorten patients’ lives without 
the latter’s explicit request? Accordingly, we can envision two kinds of cases of 
killings without explicit request – of patients whose will to live is simply ig-
nored by doctors, and of patients who during their life have formed no mor-
ally binding will either way. By killing terminally ill patients from the first 
group, doctors would commit the same kind of injustice that terminally ill 
patients suffer whenever they are legally denied assistance in dying (whether 
in addition to other forms of injustice or as the only form). By killing patients 
from the second group, on the other hand, doctors would neither harm nor 
wrong their patients, since the latter can no longer either benefit from being 
(kept) alive or exercise their right to self-determination (or, for that reason, 
any related moral right).12
Let me offer an elegant practical solution to the above problem before 
turning to my last point. Not even the most carefully crafted euthanasia law 
can draw clear enough a line between permissible and impermissible mercy 
killings, the opponents of euthanasia warn us, and so we can realistically 
expect people to cross it occasionally, if not regularly. Notice, however, that 
some of the potential dangers of legalization to people’s legitimate interest 
in, or right to, life could be countenanced otherwise, by measures much less 
severe and morally costly than the existing outright ban on euthanasia. If, 
for example, concerns about the fate of those terminally ill patients who are 
either permanently or temporarily incompetent are not exaggerated, then it 
might be wise to design a ‘no-euthanasia for me, please’ equivalent to a DNR 
(Do-Not-Resuscitate) instructions for doctors. Unlike DNRs, these DNE 
(Do-Not-Euthanize) orders would not only dispel the mystery of the patient’s 
last will, they would also legally bind doctors to refrain from euthanasia no 
matter how appropriate they may judge it themselves. Such official declara-
tions of will could be valid permanently (subject only to formal withdrawal) 
or for a limited time period (after which they’d need to be renewed) and em-
bedded either within an opt-in or an opt-out system similar to the one that 
governs the procurement of organs for transplantation. People could then 
sign forms that would, depending on the model adopted, guarantee that their 
will regarding time, place and manner of death – be it in favor of continued 
12 In a way, this dichotomy is an oversimplification. There will always be patients whose 
will is indeterminate, or indeterminable. Psychiatric and dementia patients belong to this 
group, and a lot of the debate about their proper treatment will revolve around both their well-
being and autonomy: What’s best for them, continued life or instant death? Who’s to tell? Are 
they still capable to decide for themselves or should someone else take over? The hardest cases 
to handle will be those where a person’s present preferences depart from her past will – shall 
we listen to preferences of her present self or let our surrogate decisions be guided by the will 
that her past self once undeniably formed? For an interesting way out of this conundrum, see 
Jaworska (1999).
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life or immediate death – is known to, binding for and respected (or at least 
not ignored for reasons of uncertainty) by doctors. Well-known problems 
with advance directives non-withstanding, such a solution promises a much 
better compromise between acceptable risk and expected gain than the cur-
rent legal status quo.
4.3.4. Is there anything distinctly wrong (and unjust) 
about being rushed to death?
Let me finally briefly explore the other remaining avenue. We could grant to 
the opponent that the violation of one’s right to self-determination is not as 
serious an offence as the violation of one’s right to life. What right(s), then, 
could we be violating when we force a patient to die, but not also when we 
force her to keep on living? Two candidates for such a right spring to mind: 
(a) the liberty-right to choose the time and manner of one’s death and (b) the 
claim-right not to be killed.
Now, it is immediately clear that the first candidate is a non-starter. 
Since the right to choose the time and manner of one’s death, provided there 
is such a right, is violated in both cases, i.e., both when your life is taken away 
from you without your consent and when you are forced to go on living, it 
cannot provide moral grounds for a legal discrimination between them. An-
other idea, that harms are only wrong(ful) as long as they are non-consensual 
(Feinberg 2000), fares no better in that respect, for both types of untimely 
deaths are (equally) non-consensual and to that extent (equally) wrong. The 
same goes for the suggestion that it is only wrong to cause a certain type of 
harm to those who are not indifferent to being so harmed (Belshaw 2016), 
since, by stipulation, all those deprived of the good of a timely death are de-
prived of something that they appreciate and (would) want for themselves, 
whether this good is denied to them by premature or delayed death.
The claim-right not to be killed (against one’s will) is the sole survivor, 
then. This right clearly manages to account for the difference between cases of 
killing someone against her will and forcing someone to go on living, for even 
if we want to qualify it to something like the right not to be killed against 
one’s own will, we will have violated it only when we kill someone who would 
have liked to live, but not also when we refuse to kill someone who wants 
to die. This impression is mistaken, however. While there may or may not 
be such a thing as an unqualified right not to be killed against one’s will (I 
personally doubt there is), the right under consideration is of a different kind 
– namely the right not to be killed without one’s explicit consent, or clear expres-
sion of one’s rational and autonomous will. And such a right, if indeed there is 
such a right, is surely even more controversial than an unqualified right not to 
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be killed against one’s will. But if so, then the right that the argument in favor 
of the asymmetry claim is premised upon becomes suspicious and cannot re-
ally carry the argumentative weight without further proof.
There is another reason to be skeptical of the prospects of this line of 
argumentation. As already shown, no evidence so far backs the claim that 
terminally ill patients are currently being rushed to death against their will.13 
What may be happening are relatively isolated cases where incurable patients 
with low quality of life (measured by any reasonable standard), no prospect 
of recovery and no decisional capacity left to form a morally binding will 
are euthanized. Unless one implausibly both assumes that the right to life is 
inalienable and identifies the said right with a right not to be killed under 
any circumstances (which boils down to a view that killing human beings is 
never permissible), the ascription of such a right to a person with no valuable 
life left to live and no capacity to either appreciate or denounce, choose or 
reject her own future life, cannot really be motivated by a plausible theory of 
either moral rights or the wrongness of killing.14 But then such rare killings 
either won’t constitute injustices at all (since there is no right to be violated), 
or will at best amount to a less alarming kind of harmless wrongdoings (since 
the violated right no longer protects the bearer’s vital interests or conditions 
of her free and rational agency).
It is important to be clear about the proper scope of the above argu-
ment. I’m not suggesting that victims of killings suffer either the same kind 
of injustice as the victims of forcible living, nor that the injustice they suffer 
is of exactly the same magnitude. Instead, the argument aims to establish a 
somewhat weaker claim – that the inescapable trade-offs at the end of life are, 
and will continue to be, between different kinds of injustices, not between 
injustices and mere harms, or even just (regrettable but not really culpable) 
denials of benefits. This by itself will not tip the balance in favor of legali-
zation, of course. It will, however, make the outcome of moral calculation 
much more uncertain, dependent more on empirical details and less on a 
priori moral reasoning.
5. Conclusion
More than a decade since the ground-breaking introduction of the legal right 
to die in the Netherlands, the US federal state of Oregon and Belgium, pro-
13 Or to use the established terminology, there is some evidence of non-voluntary eutha-
nasia, but none so far of involuntary euthanasia. The former occurs when the patient is not 
mentally competent (anymore) and could not request euthanasia, the latter when the patient 
is mentally competent but did not request euthanasia (Emanuel et al. 2016: 80).
14 I myself have criticized Kantian-inspired objections against a legal right to die in 
Klampfer (2001) and (2002).
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posals to legalize active voluntary euthanasia are still met with staunch op-
position and vigorous criticism. In the paper, I set out to examine the most 
popular and influential objection against legalization, the so-called slippery 
slope argument (SSA). According to the SSA, by legalizing active voluntary 
euthanasia, the least morally controversial type of euthanasia, we will never-
theless take the first step onto a slippery slope and inevitably end up in the 
moral abyss of widespread abuse and right-violations of the weakest and most 
vulnerable patients.
Have almost two decades of closely monitored practice validated such 
fears? Not really. There is no compelling empirical evidence that by legalizing 
euthanasia we will bring moral disaster upon ourselves. Absent such evidence, 
however, the existing outright legal ban on euthanasia cannot be morally 
justified, not even on the assumption that the possibility of such a disaster 
cannot be completely ruled out. Even as a measure of precaution, such a ban 
is both inefficient and excessive.
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